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NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND POWER: CHOICES FOR 'rHE FUTURE 
The world is faced with the sobering reality that within a decade 
nuclear weapons may be found everywhere, in abundance. Terrifying as the 
thought may be, one estimate is that by 1990 nuclear reactors will 
produce enough plutonium for 30,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs per year -
in the Third World alone. We must explore ways to contain the spread 
of nuclear weapons and access to nuclear weapons material. If we are 
to survive, mankind must find the key to controlling nuclear weaponry 
without denying nations the chance to satisfy their energy needs. Nations, 
while pursuing energy needs, mus~ work collectively to align their 
policies wi l h their staled goals for nuclear non-proliferati::>n. The 
result of such an effort during the next decade will stand as a monument 
to our wisdom or our folly. 
Among the myriad causes of our nuclear dilemma, five seem paramount: 
international failure to control the spread of nuclear devices; energy 
demandwhich exceed supplies; rising terrorism; the nature of nuclear 
power development; and proliferating knowledge about nuclear technology. 
At the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission's first meeting, 
in June, 1946, Bernard Baruch proposed the creation of an International 
Atomic Development Authority, to "provide the mechanism to assure that 
atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes." The ensuing debate 
produced no agreement. From Baruch's speech to today, we have a long 
record of fuilurc and nc<~r-failurc at the international level. Nuclear 
lesl ban lre<ll.ie::;, even with a loophole allowing "peaceful" underground 
l'Xplo::ion:: up lo L'iO ki Lolon:; (<rr ten Limes greater than the Ilirushima 
IJomiJ) hav<!d la dcd Lo yo:1rncr LIH· :-:upporl of <1ll nations. l·:vcn the 
Non-Proliferation 'l'reaty (NP'l') docs not command universal support. 
Many countries - including some in the nuclear club and others knocking 
at its door - are not signatories. There is no international control 
of the dangerous aspects of the nuclear fuel,cycle, especially uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. No attempt has been made to 
internationalize storage of nuclear waste. Safeguards are neither 
strengthened nor enforced. We have failed, so far, to !ring nati?nal 
policies into accord with pronouncements of goals of nuclear non-
proliferation. In the scramble for international prestige, national 
honor, and regional hegemony, nuclear weapons have become deadly pawns, 
the possession and proliferation of which bring instability and 
fear, rather than security, to a troubled world. The result is a balance 
of terror which may become unbalanced by proliferation. 
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The road to international agreement and control has become more 
difficult in the face of an increasing energy shortage. The 1973 
energy crisis, with its ensuing OPEC boycott and sky-rocketing energy 
costs, thrust many nations toward the development of nuclear power 
and the breeder reactor to meet their future energy needs. Developing 
nations face enormous pressures to assure energy sources for their 
growing economies and populations. Some developed nations have a 
sophisticated nuclear industry which reflects the investment of billions 
of dollars, thousands of jobs, and the export advantage of a marketable 
product in great demand. 
'l'he energy shortage has promoted the belief that a wide-sc~le 
development of nuclear power is the only way to close the gap between 
energy demand and energy supply. The breeder reactor has evolved 
from conscious decisions and the direction of nuclear energy develcpment 
in the past decade. A reactor which produced more plutonium than it 
used and the development of a reprocessing technology to reuse material 
from the "back end of the fuel cycle" became increasingly attractive. 
Inadequate alternate sources of energy coupled with the presumed 
shortage of uranium deposits made the breeder even more alluring. 
Bul the breeder introduces huge amounts of pure plutonium into the 
tue L eye l1• ;-tnd severely t«xes l he C<l p<tci ty of the interna ti:>nal conununi ty 
In <'Otttt·ul liH' :;pre<td of nucl.t•.tr Wl'ilpons C'i.lpo:lbilities. Al pr<~senl., 
inlern<tlional safl'guards cannot cope wilh Lhe demands which plutonium 
socicti,•s will place upon them. 1~us the energy problems of the world 
have become inextricably intertwined with the threat of nuclear 
annihilation. 
'l'hi s Lhrcat reaches beyond the motives of any existing government. 
lntern<tlional lawlessness and terrorism are endemic in our world. 
Individuals and groups turn regularly to any available means to achieve 
their goals - w:i.thout regard for morals or responsibility. They 
operate beyond the pale of restraint or responsibility, heedless of 
diplomatic pressure, triggered by events over which no nation or group 
of nations can exercise complete control. 
In Argentina terrorists invaded and took control of a nuclear 
power plant - fortunately one that was not yet operational. Air liners 
have been hijacked by a single individual. In 1968 the freighter 
Scheersburq was "relieved" of a load ·of 200 tons of treated uranium -
enough to make 30 nuclear bombs. If a clique of Moluccan fanatics 
can take over trains and schools in Holland; if an elite commando 
group can pull off a daring Entebbe raid; if a handful of terrorists 
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can overrun the Olympics; then who is to say that our present system of 
protecting nuclear materials is beyond the reach of terrorists or of 
the revolut.; onary groups which may overthrow gover:1ments. Such forms 
of international lawlessness present a constant threat to nuclear security. 
Heretofore, we have felt some security from the specter of terrorist 
control of nuclear weapons because of the nature of nuclear technology. 
The data was forebodingly difficult for all but a few scientists,, and the 
material was so dangerous to handle that workers commonly manipulated it 
with remote tongs from behind the protection of lead shields and special 
glass many feet thick. The cost of enriching fuel to reach explosive levels 
put the process out of reach of most countries, let alone individuals. 
But technological developments have destroyed most of these built-in 
S<~fcquilrdf;. No le.Hl Hhield i.s needed to handle pure plutl1nium. You 
<'dll Bdlt•ly <'oiiTY i l iu your ln:io•lt'ol!;n. II dO<!!;; not n06d nnri chmonl; 
il 1111ly llo'l'd:; lo ),.. :wt•.ar<~lnd 11·om oll11•1.· wo~ni<H;. Once l:ll'(l.lCLilod- n 
procc::;s which is tortunalely sli Ll reasonably expensive and technoliyically 
~ophisticated - it is easily converted into explosive devices. 
The information once so guarded and classified that major national 
efforts went into developing a bomb is now reasonably available in 
unclassified documents. The explosion of knowledge provides the conduit 
through which increased prospects of proliferation pour in upon us. Recently, 
as an independent study, a Princeton undergraduate designed a functional 
atomic bomb solely from information which is publicly available. He 
estimates his bomb could be built for $2000 plus the cost of the plutonium. 
He initiated his project to determine how difficult it would be for a 
terrorist group to build a bomb. llis p:r.·oject was so successful that part of 
his college paper is now classified, and he has been approached by foreign 
governments for copies. The nuclear scientists who evaluated his work 
say his bomb is more sophisticated than the Hiroshima bomb. But even 
without the technology, plutonium is a threat. It is so lethal that 
it could be distributed through the water system of a city or the ventilatim 
system of most buildings with lethal effect - and no explosion would be 
necessary at all. 
We should remember that the back end of the breeder reactor's 
fuel cycle produces plutonium in great quantities, mixed with other wastes 
more dangerous to handle. Once separated from those wastes and ready for 
recycling - at the point where the plutonium can be used as a fuel -
the plutonium is only a few days or weeks and a few dollars away from 
being a nuclear bomb of enormous destructive capacity. Those few weeks are 
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far too short for normal diplomacy to work. 
This combination of international lawlessness and the availability 
of nuclear materials and technology creates the opportunity to destroy 
the world. As nuclear knowledge and nuclear energy proliferate, this 
danger will become more acute, until, I fear, the odds will soon favor 
our annihilation rather than our survival. 
We need a comprehensive international policy, with maximum adherence 
and participation, to reduce the prospects of proliferation. We cannot 
hope to eliminate proliferation of nuclear weapons entirely, but we 
must do everything possible to reduce the probability of such proliferation. 
Let us conside. some concrete steps nuclear supplier nations, non-nuclear 
countries, and international organizations might take. 
~be agenda for action is demanding. We need to re-examine our 
commitmenls to !Jreeder reactor pro1}rams, explore alternative technologies, 
assess Lhe prospects for .:111 internal ional fuels assurance program to 
guarantee the availability of nuclear fuels, eliminate incentives for 
nations to acquire reprocessing capabilities, devise an international 
nuclear fuels leasing system, analyse the possibilities of international-
izing the fuel cycle, stimulate the development of non-nuclear energy 
in nations around the world, establish international safeguards against 
terrorism, and launch diplomatic efforts to achieve the goals of non-
proliferation. 
I believe we have not come too far down the plutonium road. We must 
cul.leel i.v1•ly n•-t•vulu;:tle our b;1~d(· assumptions and original •projections. 
We should l.1kc lh<• lime 1wccssary lo examine fuel cycle altcrnatfves 
to the breeder and reprocessing, jn quest of technologies which minimize 
proliferation and physical protection risks. President Carter has 
deferred indefinitely the commercialization of reprocessing and is 
restructuring the U.S. breeder reactor program with the hope that a 
more proliferation-resistant technology can be developed. The development 
of such a technology is worth the investment of many millions of dollars 
and should be the goal of major investigative research programs by all 
concerned nations. 
One of the bnsic assumptions we should re-examine is the raison 
d'etre for a plutonium economy. From about 1973 forward, projections of plans 
for future nuclear power increasinlgy focused on the development of the 
breeder reactor and reprocessing technology. 'fhe assumption has been that 
reprocessing would begin when there were sufficient light water reactors 
- 4 - PE 49.353 
to justify the large facilities needed to make reprocessing economically 
feasible. Plutonium would be recycled in light water reactors until the 
fast breeder reactors were introduced. The breeder would then generate 
large amounts of pluton:ium. The additional risks of widespread use 
of plutonium were justified in the minds of its advocates because it was 
presumed to be economical and necessary, given energy demand projections 
and estimates of uranium deposits. It now appears that projected demand 
curves were extremely high and estimates of uranium supplies low. 
Advocates of breeder and plutonium fuels have underestimated world-
wide supplies of uranium deposits and exaggerated the energy demand for 
the next decade. Known uranium supplies have increased about 6% per 
year on a world-wide basis during the last decade. During the past 
three years, energy demand projections have been revised downward. 
For example, official targets for 1985 for European Economy Community 
nuclear capacity have declined from 200 gigawatts in the 1974 projections 
to 74 gigawatts in 1977, a decline of 63%. 
'l'here are other serious flaws leading to the need for a reassessment. 
'rhere is reason to question whether recycling plutonium in light water 
reactors will be economically advantageous. At mos~, it now appears 
marginal. Nor does such recycling assure plutonium independence. Finally, 
evidence suggests that disposal problems would be exacerbated, not alleviate~ 
by the reprocessing of waste. Certainly there can be no question that 
proliferation of weapons-grade material to the point of ready availability 
is causing serious reappraisal among top u.s. government officials and 
citizens alike. '!'here is growing belief among many that technologies which 
1 
ulili?.e the "back end" of the fuel cycle pose serious problems. 
1 
The nuclear fuel cy.cle includes all facets of the process of obtaining 
uranium, mining, milling, converting it to a fuel by the enrichment process, 
and then utilizing it as a fuel - this is the so-called "front end" of the 
cycle. The "back end" of the nuclear fuel cycle includes any reuse or 
reprocessing of the spent fuels and separation of plutonium from other 
nuclear wastes, plus providing for a permanent waste storage program with 
adequate environmental safegu2rds. 
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In sum, the problems of proliferation, the question of storage, and 
the rising doubts about economic feasibility of plutonium usage should 
prompt us to solve our energy problems by other means than the breeder 
reactor with its companion reprocessing technology. Re-evaluation of the 
basic ~ssumptions underpinning plutonium economies has widespread 
international ramifications. 
We need to fully explore alternative technologies. We should encour-
age the use of heavy water reactors and the conversion of light water 
reactors to heavy water. We need to find ways of increasing once-through 
uranium utilization for remaining light water reactors. Developing 
non-plutonium breeders is a possibility. The development of thorium 
reprocessing technology could greatly assist nations rich in thorium 
deposits. .finally, we must control the spread of laser enrichment 
technology and centrifuge technology. As we develop alternatives to the 
reactor, we can also implement programs to encourage nations to turn away 
from the plutonium technology. 
A successful system of nuclear non-proliferation should probably 
include an international-level assurance program which would guarantee 
supplies of non-weapons grade nuclear fuels on a timely, adequate, 
reliable, and economic basis. Natural uranium and enrichment services 
must be reasonably priced and free from interruptions due to political or 
foreign policy interference. Parallel policies among suppliers of nuclear 
materials should avoid placing any reactor exporter at a commercial 
disadvantage damaging to common non-proliferation interests. An inter-
national fuel assurance system can and must remove incentives for 
nations to acquire full fuel cycles, prevent discrimination against 
consumers who fulfill their non-proliferation obligations, and discourage 
dependency of buyer nations upon possibly capricious supplier nations. 
Such a program must be buttressed by multinational agreements in 
which suppliers substantiate guarantees to buyers by backing each other's 
fuel contracts. It should also assure fuel supplies to reactor countries 
which h ave no indigenous fuel capabilities and resources. An International 
Fuel Bank, perhaps under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), is needed. As an added assurance, regional nuclear fuel 
repositories, storing perhaps a year's working inventory of fuel per 
country, might be developed to insulate .1sers from potential interruption 
of their access to enriched uranium. 
Creating incentives to reduce the non-nuclear nations' desires to 
acquire reprocessing capabilities would help facilitate non-proliferation. 
- 6 - PE 49.353 
Dealing with the spent fuels from the back end of the cycle is a critical 
problem. A system of leasing nuclear fuels, rather than selling them, 
could require the return of used fuels to the supplier nation or to 
a multinational fuel reprocessing center. This would eliminate any reason 
for a non-supplier nation to reprocess plutonium and use it as a fuel. 
By keeping plutonium out of the hands of non-suppliers, such a program 
would substantially reduce the chance of weapons-grade material being 
stolen or diverted for terrorist uses. 
User nations would have no need to store wastes and spent fuels or 
to build and operate uranium enrichment plants for energy programs. 
Any reprocessing plant construction, then, would signal an attempt 
to provide weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear armament program. In such 
a leasing system, supplier nations or organizations would own and lease 
nuclear fuels at a fee based upon the energy content of the spent fuel, 
when it was returned to the supplier. 
' 
In the absence of a workable leasing program, the IAEA could establish 
multinational regional centers to produce enriched uranium, reprocess used 
f·~-els, store fissionable materials, convert such materials into nuclear 
fuel elements, temporarily store spent fuels, and permanently manage 
disposal of radioactive wastes. Such an internationalization of the 
complete nuclear fuel cycle is well worth our consideration. 
At Lhe back end of the fuPl cycle, alequate storage for spent fuel 
and nuclear wastes is urgently needed. Providing storage would further 
alleviate the pressure for reprocessing capability. The adoption of a 
leasing arrangement or of international control of the cycle would 
reduce this pressure for reprocessing capability while minimizing the 
problem of security at waste depositories by reducing the number of such 
sites. 
There is no need to deny needy nations the use of nuclear energy, 
and it would certainly be gratuitous for nuclear states to propose such 
an arrangement. What is essential if proliferation is to be kept at a 
minimum is to prevent the spread of reprocessing technology and thus limit 
the availability of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. 
It is hardly necessary to say that non-nuclear energy alternatives 
need to be developed to the maximum. Providing non-nuclear states with 
economically competitive supplies of coal, oil, and synthetic fuels can 
reduce their need for nuclear power. Technical and financial assistance 
to develop indigenous energy sources should be provided, perhaps through 
IAEA. All these ron-nuclear initiatives can help discourage states from 
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acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. 
Another essential step in controlling proliferation is to improve our 
defenses against theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials and 
facilities by terrorist groups. These safeguards, under the IAEA, should 
include stricter international standards for the physical protection of 
nuclear materials, installations, and the transport of nuclear materials. One 
possible consideration w an international nuclear security force to 
protect international shipments of nuclear materials, including wastes 
containing p.1utoni.um. In any event, we must bring the various IAEA safe-
guards systems up to a uniform standard,_ with emphasis on personal inspection. 
We should also improve technologies, instrumentation, and equipment for 
national and international safeguard systems. A more accurate material 
accounting system at all levels should give us an accurate tally of nuclear 
materials and plutonium resources at any time. Finally, we need to establish 
internationalprocedures which would give us the means to respond quickly.in 
the case of the theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials or an 
attack on nuclear facilities. 
In addition to consi.dering these steps in the areas of energy problems 
and terrorist access, we should examine efforts which could be taken in 
international affairs to control proliferation. Although the post-World 
War II efforts have not been very successful, we should explore all 
possibilitie<. that still exist in this area. 
First, diplomatic initiatives to reduce general .world tensions and 
resolve specific conflicts between nations could reduce the pressure on 
non-nuclear nations to acquire nuclear weapons technology. A second 
important step would be strong efforts to encourage more nations to 
ratify the Non-Proliferati. on 'l'reatv and to forswear the use of nuclear 
weapons. 'I'hc NP'f represents an inLernational system in which states agree 
that their security interests arc best served by avoiding the further spread 
of nuclear weapon capabilities. •rhe essence of the treaty is a compromise 
in which discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear nations is accepted 
in the military sphere in return for nuclear fuel assurances, and energy 
benefits in the civil sphere. Beyond the NPT, we need to conclude a com-
prehensive nuclear test ban treaty which reduces the level of "peaceful" 
underground explosions to well below 150 kilotons. 
Concerning exports, it is important that nuclear supplier nations limit 
the export of nuclear materials to natural uranium and low enriched uranium 
and that they prohibit the export of weapons-grade enriched uranium and 
plutonium, except as a constituent of fabricated nuclear fuel. It may 
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also be necessary to ban exports of nuclear power reactors that require highly 
enriched uranium as fuel. Further, the world needs at least a three to 
five-year moratorium on the export of reprocessing plants. In essence, 
supplier nations should not export technology, plants, or equipment or provide 
technical and financial assistance for the construction and operation of 
facilities to enrich uranium or produce plutonium. Progress in negotiations 
among the nuclear suppliers in this respect is encouraging butneed to be 
extended through legislative action to support the concept that the best 
international export policy for reprocessing plants is not to export them at 
all. 
Another policy option - extreme but useful for discussion - involves 
exercising international sanctions against violators, once an agreement is 
reached on universal international non-proliferation policies . Diplomatic 
pressures exists which nations could apply to other countries to bring them 
into compliance with the stated goals of non-proliferatbn. Nations which 
construct and operate enrichment or plutonium production facilites in 
violation of NPT commitments or IAEA safeguard agreements, nations which 
develop and test nuclear explosives, nations ~ich provide a haven for 
nuclear saboteurs might all be the target of such sanctions. Nuclear supplier 
nations could apply sanctions or take other action against such nations and 
against any supplier nation which helps a non-nuclear state acquire the 
capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials. States could cut off 
nuclear assistance or economic aid to non-weapons states which would not 
ci thcr ratify the NP'l' or agr._,e to J.'\EA inspections of their nuclear 
facilities. Such a course, while being both extreme and hard to realize, is 
still worth some consideration. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, nearly everyone today sees the danger of continued nuclear 
proliferation. We admit its danger. Now is the time for our nations to 
examine old assumptions, accept the new realities of proliferation, and bring 
policy in line with rhetoric. In our world, nations must work together 
to establish a fuel azsurance system which guarantees energy supplies wi. thout 
increasing weapons-grade fuels. We must explore the need for an international 
fuel bank, a leasing sytem for nuclear fuels, and internationalization of. the 
entire fuel cycle. We must encourage the development of a less dangerous 
nuclear technology than the breeder and of non-nuclear energy sources. We 
need a basic re-evaluation of the breeder reactor program. International 
safeguards against terrorists must be strengthened. On the diplomatic front, 
we must take initiatives to reduce world tensions, reduce the need for nuclear 
weapons, encourage more nations to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reduce 
or eliminate "peaceful" nuclear tests, curb exports of enriched uranium , 
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plutonium, and reproces~ing plants, implement a moratorium on nuclear export 
sales, and consider sanctions against nations violating the NPT~ 
We must pledge ourselves to this and more. For our children and 
~ their children, we must act now to reduce, perhaps someday to eliminate, 
the spread of nuclear weaponry which ~oday so tragically shadows the future. 
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